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Whether or not this logical result is desirable is for the courts to
determine. It is a possibility, however, not to be ignored. In interpreting the laws of today, courts must foresee the problems of tomorrow.
To do otherwise is to pave the road for confusion, disorder, and injustice. If those who in fact have been wronged can be provided with
an easy means of redress without subjecting defendants to unconscionable hardships, a desirable balance will be reached. 53 However, extreme
measures to protect plaintiffs, such as may result from a broad interpretation of the Nelson decision, may well discredit the very system of
justice which the courts seek to promote. It is well to remember that
injustice lies at the extremity of justice.
PATRICK D.

SULLIVAN

CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF INTERSPOUSAL TORTS
Actions between spouses involving torts to the person were not
recognized at common law.1 The modern view has resulted in the abrogation of the common law rule by decision or by statute in many jurisdictions. But because of the intimacy of the relationship involved, a
fear of collusion between spouses has arisen when insurance is involved,
particularly with respect to automobile accidents.
The New York Legislature passed a statute in 1937 permitting interspousal tort actions.2 At the same time, section 167(3) was added to
the New York Insurance Law, which provides that "no policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because of death of or injuries to his or her spouse or because of injury
to, or destruction of property of his or her spouse unless express provisome purposes though not for all. If one State may, without violation of the due
process clause, extend the authority of its courts beyond its boundaries over persons and situations not sufficiently related to that State, the separate identity of
States will be reduced to a mere fiction. Individual states could undertake at the
expense of other States to enlarge the sphere of their authority to nationwide dimensions. It requires no flight of fancy to foresee the resulting maze of lawsuits
adjudicating the interests of persons having only the faintest and most remote links
with the State exercising authority. If the due process clause is not effective
to restrain such extensions of local power, then the federal system is likely to be
transformed into something very different from anything we have known." Erlanger
Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 5o2, 509 (4 th Cir. 1956).
OArmstrong, Comment, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 252 (1952).
'141 C.J.S. 877 (1944).

2N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 57.
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sion relating specifically thereto is included in the policy." 3 This New
York approach appears to be unique. "These simultaneous enactments
disclose a considered legislative intent to create a right of action theretofore denied, and at the same time to protect insurance carriers against
4
loss through collusive actions between husband and wife."
But what effect is to be given the New York Insurance Law in cases
arising in a forum other than New York and in which a New York
insurance policy is involved? The governing law applied in such
cases could be that of the place of contracting, 5 the place of performance,0 the place contemplated by the parties, 7 or the place having the
most substantial connection with the transaction, using an approach
called the grouping of contacts or center of gravity rule.8
The New York Court of Appeals was called upon to interpret these
statutes in New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker.9 This case arose out of
an automobile accident in Connecticut. The spouses were residents of
New York and the contract of insurance was entered into there. The
husband sustained injuries in the accident which occurred while his
wife, the insured party, was driving. The insurance company sought
3

N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(3).

'Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 258 App. Div. 6o3, 605, 17 N.Y.S.
2d 338, 340 (2d Dep't 1940), affirming 171 Misc. 908, 14 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
appeal denied, 259 App. Div. 731, 19 N.Y.S.2d 311 (2d Dep't 194o).
6Fisher v. Firemen's Fund Indemnity Co., 244 F.2d 194 (ioth Cir. 1957); Williams
v. McFerrin, 242 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1957); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of New York, 177 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 931 (195o);
Maryland Gas. Co. v. Hearn, 46 N.J. Super. 482, 135 A.2d 28 (1957); Buzzone v. Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co., 41 N.J. Super. 511, 125 A.2d 551 (1956), aff'd, 23 N.J.
447, 129 A.2d 561 (1956); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Anastasio, 5 Misc. 2d 238, 158
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1956); General Acc. Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Ganser, 2
Misc. 2d 18, 15o N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Lamb v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Misc.
2d 236, x6i N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
OMidland Valley R.R. v. Moran Nut and Bolt Mfg. Co., 8o Ark. 399, 97 S.W.
679 (1906); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 110 (3d ed. '949). Cf. General Acc. Fire
&Life Assurance Corp. v. Ganser, 2 Misc. 2d 18, 15o N.Y.S.2d 705, 709 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
TPritchard v. Norton, io6 U.S. 124 (1882); Brown v. Gates, 120 Wis. 349, 97
N.W. 221, 98 N.W. 205 (19o3); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 11o (3 d ed. 1949).
8
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Simon, 151 F. Supp. 408, 411 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). "The court will consider all acts ... touching the transaction in relation to
the several states involved and will apply as the law governing... the law of that
state with which the facts are in most intimate contact." W. H. Barber Co.v. Hughes,
223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1945); "[T]he merit of its approach is that it gives
to the place 'having the most interest in the problem' paramount control over
the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus allowing the forum
to apply the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation'." Auten v. Auten, 3o8 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, lo2
(1954); Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 Yale
L.J. 655, 672 (1921).
03 N.Y.2d 1, 143 N.E.2d 357 (1957)-
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a declaratory judgment in New York decreeing that it was not liable to
defend the action against the defendant wife in Connecticut or to pay
any judgment which might be obtained against her by the husband.
The Supreme Court of New York denied the plaintiff's and granted the
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Appellate
Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
Appellate Division for the plaintiff.
The defendants made two main contentions: first, that the New
York Insurance Law is inapplicable since the place of performance
of the insurance contract is where the accident occurs, and that Connecticut does not have any limiting statute comparable to the New York
Insurance Law; second, that the simultaneous passage of the two acts
in 1937 indicated that the legislature intended to protect carriers
only where the accidents are within the State of New York. The latter
contention is based on the fact that prior to 1937 spouses could sue
each other in tort in Connecticut on account of an accident in Connecticut, and the insurance company would have been obligated to
discharge the liability of an insured established in such a suit. The
same action could not have been brought in New York.' 0 There is
nothing in the statute indicating an intention on the part of the legislature to alter that situation. The amendment was designed solely,
the defendants argue, to protect insurance companies from the new
liability in New York that had been created by the amendment to the
Domestic Relations Law.
The court answered the first contention by stating that there was
no issue before it as to how performance was to be accomplished, or
as to the sufficiency of the performance, but only an issue of whether
or not there was to be any performance at all. "Is the defendant...
insured? Has Amsterdam agreed to indemnify her for the loss here
anticipated? What was the contract the parties made? What were the
right, (sic) and obligations which flowed from the document they
drew? These are questions, the answers to which are governed solely
by the lex loci contractus-New York State ..
13To apply the law of
1.
Connecticut to ascertain the contract between the parties would give
extraterritorial effect to the laws of that state. The statute "is mandated
into and made a part of every policy of automobile liability insur2
ance issued in this State."'
Nor would the court agree with the defendants' second line of
10

Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
2"New Amsterdam Gas. Co., v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 143 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1957).
22Ibid.
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reasoning. Until the change in its Domestic Relations Law, New York
insurance carriers were not exposed to any substantial danger of actions based on collusion between spouses, for such suits could only
be brought in a state that both permitted the suit and involved an
accident within that state. The court cited Mertz v. Mertz,l3 decided
prior to the passage of the two amendments, in which it was held that
one spouse could not sue another in New York for an alleged tort
committed in Connecticut, a state which permitted such an action.
"The manifest purpose of subdivision 3 of section 167 was to protect
carriers from collusive actions between spouses arising out of automobile accidents. Surely the Legislature recognized that the possibility
of fraud and collusion is the same no matter where the accident oc14

curs."

The Stecker case presents an interesting conflict of laws problem
that in recent years has appeared before the courts in increasing numbers. Three major questions are involved in nearly all cases of this type:
the capacity of the spouses to sue one another, the applicable tort law,
and the liability of the insurer to defend the primary tort action against
the insured spouse and to pay any judgment rendered against its
insured.
The general rule and the rule adopted by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws1 reflects the tendency to decide these caess on tort principles-the law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury. 16 With only a few exceptions, 17 the cases

hold that the law of the place of wrong also determines the capacity of
the parties to sue one another.
There are three possibilities as to the law applicable to determine
whether there is an actionable tort: the law of the forum, the law of the
place of the accident, and the law of the domicile.' 8 In the majority
271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
"New Amsterdam Gas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 143 N.E.2d 357, 36o (1957).

15§ 378 (1934).

"6Rowe v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 231 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956); Jones v. Kinney, 113 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Mo. 1953);
Sharp v. Johnson, 248 Minn. 518, 8o N.W.2d 65o (1957); Dell'Aria v. Bonfa, 307
S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1957); Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943); Hudson
v. Decker, 7 Utah 2d 24, 317 P.2d 594 (1957); Urban v. Chars, I Wis. 2d 582, 85
N.W.2d 386 (1957). The cases on this point are multitudinous.
'7Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Kyle v. Kyle, 21o
Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936);
Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 6o4 (1935). In these cases the forum is
also the domicile of at least one of the parties. These are samples of the "public
policy" cases, where the lex fori refuses to recognize the lex lod delicti approach.
2"The law of the domicile is much neglected in the United States but is apparently given strong emphasis in civil law. "[i]t is commonly assumed that in certain re-

270

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XV

of cases, the forum will also be either the place of accident or place of
domicile.
In some of the earlier cases, the action was brought in a state of
domicile which permitted interspousal actions, while the place of the
accident did not permit such actions.19 Applying the rule that the
place of accident control all elements of the case, it was held that the
lex loci delicti applied and the plaintiff could not maintain the action.
On the other hand, where the action is brought in a forum of the
domicile which does not recognize such actions, there has been a tendency to disregard the lex loci delicti and apply the lex fori which is
in accord with the domestic policy of the forum. 20 Though later contradicted in New York by Coster v. Coster,21 in which the Court of
Appeals held that the capacity of the parties to sue was controlled by
the lex loci delicti, a good example of this lex fori approach appears
in Mertz v. Mertz.22 Judge Lehman there said: "The sovereign power
of each state is coterminous with its territorial limits. Its law alone
determines what acts may be performed there with impunity and from
what acts liability enforceable in its courts shall flow. The law of one
state has in other jurisdictions such force only as is lent to it by the law
of such jurisdiction. A cause of action for personal injuries is transitory.
Liability follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person
may be found. None the less, a cause of action arising in one state may
be enforced in another state only by the use of remedies afforded by the
law of the forum where enforcement is sought.123 Later in the opinion
spects the legal position of an individual should normally be determined by the law
of that state with which he is deemed to be connected in a permanent way, rather
than by the divergent laws of those states in which he may happen to be physically
present, to act, or engage in transactions." i Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study ioi (1945). "As respects provisions excluding lawsuits between husband and wife, the American rule that the law of the forum or, in the case of an action in tort, the law of the place of the wrong should be applied, is not shared by
other countries...." Id. at 322. "It may be briefly noted in recalling the analogy of
marital relations that in this country actions for tort between parents and child ...
are purely tort matters, while in civil law they are primarily incidents of the family
law." Id. at 606.
"The effect of intermarriage of the parties upon tort liability has also been
frequently referred to the law of the place of the tort .... The important social
purpose here has to do primarily with domestic relations and therefore the domiciliary law might well be applied, since for other purposes concerning domestic
relations it is so applied." Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 206 (2d ed. 1951).
"Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Howard v. Howard, 2oo
N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 1o1 (1931); Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (ig3i).
"See note 17 supra.
21289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 5o9 (1943).
"271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
'4d. at 598.
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it was stated: "The law of the forum determines the jurisdiction of
the courts, the capacity of parties to sue or be sued, the remedies
which are available to suitors and the procedure of the courts." 24 Judge
Lehman also seemed to be hinting to the New York Legislature to
alter the common law rule forbidding interspousal actions. 2 5 The accident occurred in Connecticut, which had abolished the common law
rule as to immunity, whereas the suit was brought in the forum of
domicile, New York.
It is to be noted that where the forum and place of accident coincide, little or no regard is given to the law of the domicile of the parties.
The cases are decided on tort principles rather than as an incident of
family law. Perhaps the state of the domicile has the greater interest in
the matter: either denying such suits on the basis of preserving domestic
tranquillity, or permitting them on the basis that such actions will no
more disturb the tranquillity than will interspousal actions concerning
other rights. There appears to be no valid reason for disregarding
this aspect of the conflicts problem except for the mechanical application 26 of a rule meant to standardize the approach in conflict cases but
which has been achieved at the expense of the family law of the domicile. For example, why should a state where an accident occurs, which
does not permit such suits, be allowed to project its law into the state of
domicile which allows such actions, and defeat the right of an injured
spouse merely because the accident occurred in the former state? The
domestic law of the parties should outweigh (and the parties probably
so expect) the law of the lex loci delicti with respect to their rights to
institute suit against one another.
27
In July 1955, Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co.
was decided. This case appears to have been the first brought outside
'Aid.at 599.

2"VWe are told that the rule 'exists merely as a product of judicial interpretation, is vestigial in character, and embodies no tenable policy of morals or social
welfare.' That is a strong indictment of the existing law, and, if true, calls for
change in the law .... [Cjhange, if any, must he made by the Legislature." Id. at
598. "A disability to sue which arises solely from the marital status and which has no
relation to a definition of wrong or the quality of an act from which liability would
othervise spring may perhaps be an anachronistic survival of a common-law rule.
Even then the courts should not transform an anachrony into an anomaly, and
a disability to sue attached by our law to the person of a wife becomes an anomaly
if another state can confer upon a wife, even though residing here, capacity to sue
in our courts upon a cause of action arising there." Id. at 6oo.
-Other than producing uniformity, about the best that can be said for the application of the lex loci delicti rule is its ease of application. Therein lies its almost
universal appeal. See Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 2o
"142 Conn. 573, 16 A.2d 169 (1955).

(2d ed. 1951).
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New York and involving the New York insurance statute. The wife
obtained a judgment against her husband as a result of a tort committed in Connecticut. Suit was then brought in Connecticut against
the insurance company to satisfy the judgment. The defendant insurer
demurred on the basis of the New York Insurance Law, the policy
having been issued in New York. The court agreed that the construction of the contract was controlled by the law of New York. But it
then stated that the lower court was "justified in presuming that the
New York legislature was aware of the rule that, in an action brought
in another state by one spouse to recover for injuries caused by the
negligence of the other in that state, the law of the place where the
injuries were received governs .... It is clear that the New York legislature had no intent to control a foreign factual situation over which
it assumed to have no control." 28 One writer has suggested that the
Connecticut court used the renvoi in arriving at its decision, 29 and the
approach strongly supports the contention. However, the outcome
appears contradictory. Conceding that the contract was to be interpreted under New York law, the Connecticut court relied on the
Coster case as the basis for a remission, in the renvoi manner, to the
substantive law of Connecticut, because the accident occurred there.
The question involved was characterized as one sounding in tort. Since
the real issue was the liability of the insurance company under a contract, the question could more properly have been characterized as
sounding in contract. The court apparently overlooked the holding
in Lamb v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,30 in which the named insured
loaned his car to the defendant-husband, who injured his plaintiffwife while driving in Connecticut. She sued the named insured and
her husband, who was also an insured under the terms of the policy.
The company refused to defend her husband. Plaintiff was awarded
judgment and then sued the company on the judgment. The New
York court held that "concededly the statute does not apply to an
accident in Connecticut. But this suit is brought not upon an accident
but upon a contract, made in New York and performable here. The
statute applies to it."' If a renvoi was applied in the Williamson case,
Connectikut did not make a thorough search of the New York law.
In September 1955, the trial court in the Stecker case 32 adopted
the view of Williamson, that the insurance law was not intended to
2Id. at 172.
20o0mment, 35 B.U.L. Rev. 291, 293 (1955).
105 Misc. 2d 236, 161 N.Y.S_.d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
"Id. at 705.
322o8 Misc. 858, 145 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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diminish the liability of automobile insurance carriers, and the rule
in Coster as to the lex loci delicti. As for the contract, it was held
that the place of performance controls, and the law of the state of
Connecticut governs the performance of plaintiff's obligation to defend against the action.
In December 1955, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire decided
Priddle v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,33 a similar case arising under
the New York statutes. The court relied upon the trial court decision in
Strecker: "It is not for us to speculate either upon the course which
the Stecker case may take in the courts of New York, or upon the
views which the Court of Appeals may entertain if the issue of this
case should ultimately reach that court. Applying the decided cases, we
are of the opinion that the parties must be considered to have intended
the coverage to extend to the claims of a spouse arising out of an accident occurring outside of New York." 34 New Hampshire clearly expressed its willingness to go along with the New York interpretation,
and even seemed to suspect that the Stecker case would not stand up on
appeal.
Next came General Acc. Fire 6 Life Assurance Corp. v. Ganser,35
brought in the Supreme Court of New York by an insurance company
for a declaration of the insurer's rights arising out of an accident in
South Carolina, where the wife's suit against her husband's administrator was pending in a federal court. It was held that the right of the
wife to recover in tort is determined under the laws of South Carolina.
But her rights under the policy arises ex contractu and must ordinarily
be fixed and determined by the lex loci contractus. The court reviewed
the Lamb, Stecker, and Williamson cases, pointing out that neither
of the latter two cases mentioned Lamb, which had gone unchallenged
for fifteen years. "Despite the holding of the learned Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut in the Williamson case, this court is of the
opinion that logic compels, and the decision in Lamb v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co .,... requires the determination that the policy in question affords no coverage in any action based upon the liability of one
spouse against the other."36
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York then
reversed the trial court's decision in Stecker.a7 In commenting upon
Williamson, the court said, "Suffice it to say that this case is not an
8ioo N.H. 73, 119 A.2d 97 (1955).
3Id. at ioi.
2 DfMisc.
2d i8,15o N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
712.
31 App. Div. 2d 629, 152 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1st Dep't 1956).

"Id.at
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authority insofar as it attempts to fix and determine New York law."' 38
And later, "This exclusion provision is mandated into every policy
of automobile liability insurance issued in this State .... "9 This determination was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.
No attempt is here made to evaluate the relative merits of the conflicting views as to interspousal immunity or liability or to consider
the merits of the New York statutes dealing with the subject.40 But the
31Id. at 881.

'OId. at

882.

4°For an excellent discussion on interspousal immunity see Ford, Interspousal
Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus
the Restatement, 15 Pitt. L. Rev. 397 (1954)It is not the purpose here to consider the merits of the New York insurance
statute. It appears odd, though, that policies issued in New York do not incorporate the statute into the insurance contract. The insurance carriers, for some
reason, appear to be content to omit such a provision and to litigate their rights
through declaratory judgment proceedings, which in the majority of cases will
take place while the primary tort action is pending in another forum. The logical
course to pursue, if the companies really fear collusion between spouses, would
be the inclusion of a provision in the policy excluding coverage of suits between
spouses.
Furthermore, the collusive element is probably exaggerated. The all-encompassing New York Insurance Law possibly keeps more valid than collusive claims
out of court. There is the possibility of collusion any time insurance is involved.
See, for example, the following: General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Morgan,
33 F. Supp. 190, 192 (W.D.N.Y. 194o), was a declaratory judgment action by
the insurance company as to its liability to the administrator of the wife. Both
husband and wife were killed in an auto accident while the husband was driving.
Held that the New York insurance statute was intended to bar actions between
"spouses" and not fraudulent actions between parties other than spouses. Travelers
Indemnity Co. v. Unger, 4 Misc. 2d 955, 158 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1956), was
likewise a declaratory judgment action by the insurance company. The company
was held liable to members of the insured partnership, though not to the husband, also a member of the partnership, for injuries sustained by the wife caused
by her husband's negligent driving. In Reis v. Economy Hotels and Restaurants Purveyors Inc., 4 Misc. 2d 146, 155 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1956), a wife sued the insured corporation of which her husband was president, the husband driving
while in the scope of employment. In Jacobs v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co., 2 Misc. 2d 428, 152 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. 1956), the husband and his brother,
insureds, operated a store where the wife was injured. The insurance company
was held liable to the brother-in-law, but not to the husband. General Acc. Fire &
Life Assur. Corp. v. Katz, 3 Misc. 2d 328, 15o N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1956), was a declaratory judgment action by the insurance company. The son, insured, allowed his
father to use his car. The mother was killed and her administrator sued the son.
The insurance company could disclaim as to the third party defendant father, but
the son could not be deprived of coverage. Manhattan Gas. Co. v. Cholakis, 206
Misc. 287, 133 N.Y.S.2d 9o (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 1o41, 137 N.Y.S.2d
612 (ist Dep't 1954), was also a declaratory judgment action by the insurer. The
husband was killed while the son was driving. The insured wife, as executrix,
sued herself and her son. Held that the policy did not cover a cause of action against
the wife, but as to the son, the statute says "spouse" and the court would not read
any other provsion which would also bar an action against the son. In Munsert v.
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question of the capacity of one spouse to sue the other and the question
of tort are alien situations which have merged into one problem.
Family law is primarily the concern of the domicile-hence the law of
the domicile should control capacity. Conversely, liability is a question
of negligence and should be determined by the law of the place of
accident-the lex loci delicti. The forum should balance the factors
involved and base its decision on that point which appears more significant. The center of gravity approach, applied to contracts, would
bring a similar result in the realm of torts.4 1 For example: l. Where
the forum does not permit interspousal actions, this is the major factor
so far as this jurisdiction is concerned, and the case need go no further,
being dismissed without prejudice. 2. Where the forum permits interspousal actions, a further query is posed. Does the state of the domiFarmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 229 WVis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938), the father
administrator, who was also the insured, sued the insurance company to recover
for the death of a minor son caused by the negligence of another minor son who
was driving. Since the policy excluded any obligation to the insured, he was
barred from any recovery for his own personal benefit, but he was allowed to recover to the extent of one-half of the judgment awarded for the benefit of the
mother.
It is the function of the court, through its rules of procedure and evidence, and
by instructions to the jury, ,to sort the valid from the collusive claims. "The danger
of fraudulent and trivial claims is no more real than that danger in litigation between other parties, and the courts and juries are as able to deal with trivial, fraudulent, and fictitious claims between spouses as well as with such claims between
other litigants." Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.V.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1955). Even the
plaintiff's attorney has the duty to determine, if possible, prior to the institution
of suit, whether or not his client's claim is valid.
It is conceded that, absent insurance, an injured spouse would probably not
institute action, even though a valid claim is present. In the majority of homes
there would be little purpose in incurring an additional expense. The presence
of insurance, however, does not of itself make the action collusive. Rather, the collusion feared is the establishment of the claim by the false evidence. The insurance carriers can best protect themselves by defending such actions without keeping valid
claims out of court. Policies specify that the company be given notice and the right
to defend suits involving the insured under the contract. There is no danger, then, of
an action coming to judgment without notice to the insurer. If such were the case,
the company could disclaim liability for not being allowed to defend as stipulated
in the contract. The financial loss is as great whether the one injured is a spouse or a
stranger. Where interspousal actions are permitted, the liability of the carrier
should be determined in the same manner as though the parties were strangers, with
collusion an element to be considered during the course of the trial.
"See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US. 571 (1953), where the United States Supreme
Court used the balancing technique to determine the law applicable to an action
brought under the Jones Act. Also see Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn.
376, 82 N.V.2d 365 (1957), where the Minnesota court probably did the same thing,
though it did not so expressly state. "The object of this paper is, however, not to
argue the merits of the English proper law doctrine as applied to contracts, but to
suggest that there is room for a similar approach in the field of torts." Morris, The
Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 883 (1951).

